Trade Diversion and Sanction Evasion No Longer Business As Usual

Posted by Wang, Yi on March 15, 2023

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Trade Diversion and Sanction Evasion No Longer Business As Usual

贸易转移与制裁规避风光不再

1. Executive Summary 概要

Sanctions can and are weakened through trade diversion and evasion.[1]  To “prevent corporate crime before it occurs,”[2] the anti-corruption and trade authorities are combining and revitalizing policy tools to shift financial penalties from non-participating shareholders onto wrongdoers directly accountable.  This memo focuses on consequences against risky behaviors through trade diversion and sanction evasion, and priorities to support compliance and growth.

制裁（作为贸易与投资监管措施）面临贸易转移和规避问题而被削弱。为“预防犯罪重在防患于未然”，（美国）反腐败和贸易主管部门正在整合、重振既有监管政策依据和行政资源，改变过去由未参与违法行为的股东实际承担违法成本（罚金）的窘境，并将违规成本转移到违规责任人员身上。 本备忘录旨在简述针对贸易转移和制裁规避对风险行为的法律后果，并供企业合规与发展参考。

数据来源：彭博贸易数据显示俄罗斯进口的芯片恢复到俄乌战争战前2020年的水平。

• Actionable Insights 执行参考

With an “all-tool approach” and since January 2023, US Department of Justice (DOJ) has rolled out updated guidelines to further substantiate and implement DDG Monaco Memo issued on September 15, 2022 to prosecute culpable individuals, safeguard voluntary disclosure of historical misconduct through effective cooperation and remediation, with the auspices of the regulators.[4] (See our previous briefings.[5])

自2023年1月以来，在“多管齐下”的方针下，美国司法部（DOJ）已经推出了若干指南更新推进2022年9月15日发布的副总检察长（DDG）摩纳哥备忘录的实施（强调个人追责、与监管当局合作及补救、保障自愿披露历史违规行为）。（详见此前备忘录）。

Overall, DOJ singles out certain “grey area” circumvention tactics and requires management and their counsels (and risk functions) to more accurately identify early warning signs and proactively implement effective remediation measures:

整体而言，美国司法部（DOJ）将某些传统属于“灰色操作”的规避行为明确纳入优先监管视野，并要求企业管理层及其法律顾问等风控职能人员能够更准确识别警惕情形并积极推进有效的补救措施。

• Data – Off-system communication or material misstatement: either off-system chats or selective information omission in internal correspondence constitutes not only red flag but also sign of weak “policy environment” that undermines compliance infrastructure;

数据——体外运作或瞒报：无论是企业体外运作的渠道还是内部沟通中的选择性信息遗漏，不仅明确构成了警惕情形，也将被视为削弱合规基础设施的“工作环境”的标志。

• Operation and work streams – Trade diversion & high-risk businesses: operational arrangements structured to actually use third-party / countries to divert goods to sanctioned countries are specific targets for enforcement;

运营和工作流——贸易转移与高风险业务：（若）实际利用第三方/国使得货物转移到受制裁国家，该等实质规避的业务安排将触及执法部门监管与执法。

• HR – Distorted HR process and deficient disciplinary action:  deficiency in HR process such as lack of disciplinary actions (against personnel directly responsible for criminal conduct and those with oversight) would also render a corporate compliance program “ineffective.”  Remediation taken but failing to prevent recurrence would still be considered insufficient to earn cooperation credits to secure leniency and settlement from regulators;

人力资源管理——人力资源流程与纪律处分存在的风险敞口：人力资源流程若存在缺陷，例如（针对犯罪行为直接责任人员和负有管理监督职责的人员）纪律处分不力，将使企业合规体系被监管部门视为“有效性不足”。企业若采取了补救措施但该等措施并未能防止违规再次发生，则将被视为存在缺陷，并影响企业在后续争取监管机构的宽大处理和和解程序中从监管部门获得合作加分。

• Executive compensation – clawbacks and compliance criteria: the new Criminal Division’s Pilot Program Regarding Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks requires that, when entering into criminal resolutions (before settlement and closure of the case), corporations must implement compliance-related criteria in their compensation and bonus system and to report to DOJ about such implementation during the term of such resolutions.  Penalty reduction would generally be available only for those who seek to recoup compensation from culpable employees and others “who both (a) had supervisory authority over the employee(s) or business area engaged in the misconduct and (b) knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct.”

高管薪酬——薪酬追回与合规标准：美国司法部更新后的《刑事司关于薪酬激励和薪酬追回的试点方案》要求：在达成刑事决议时（在和解与结案之前），企业必须在其薪酬和奖金制度中制定并执行合规相关标准，并在该等案件决议的有效期内向美国司法部报告其落实情况。处罚减免措施一般将仅适用于从应问责人员追回薪酬的企业，即那些寻求从应惩戒的人员和其他“(a)对从事不当行为的雇员或业务领域负有管理监督权责的人员，以及(b)明知或故意对不当行为视而不见的人 ”追回薪酬的企业。

These prioritized elements aim to deter risky behavior and foster a culture of compliance, and “seek to potentially shift the burden of corporate financial penalties away from shareholders—who in many cases do not have a role in misconduct—onto those more directly responsible.”

以上监管部门侧重评估的因素旨在阻止高风险行为、培育合规文化，并“寻求将罚金惩戒实际承担方从无辜股东身上转到更直接的违规责任人身上。”

In terms of common red flags to eradicate the use of intermediaries to evade sanctions or export controls, the DOJ-Treasury-Commerce Joint Compliance Note highlights the following:

旨在铲除利用中间方规避（美国）制裁或出口管制的违规现象，美国司法部、财政部、商务部的联合合规备忘录列出了以下常见警惕情形：

• Use of corporate vehicles such as legal arrangements to obscure (i) ownership, (ii) source of funds, or (iii) countries involved, particularly sanctioned jurisdictions;

利用法律架构等公司工具来模糊与遮掩(i)企业所有人，(ii)资金来源，或(iii)涉及的国家，尤其是是受制裁的法域；

• A customer’s reluctance to share information about the end use of a product;

客户不愿意分享有关产品最终用途的信息；

• Use of shell companies to conduct international wire transfers, often involving financial institutions in jurisdictions distinct from company registration;

使用空壳公司进行国际电汇，往往涉及与注册地不同的司法管辖区的金融机构；

• Declining customary installation, training, or maintenance of the purchased item(s);

拒绝产品通常需要的安装、培训或维护所购物品等环节；

• IP addresses that do not correspond to a customer’s reported location data;

IP地址与客户报告的位置数据不一致；

• Last-minute changes to shipping instructions that appear contrary to customer history or business practices;

最后一刻改变运输指令，而该等指令看来与客户历史或商业惯例相悖；

• Payment coming from a third-party country or business not listed on the End-User Statement or other applicable end-user form;

来自第三方国/企业的付款未在《最终用户声明》或其他适用的最终用户表列出；

• Use of personal email accounts instead of company email addresses;

使用个人电子邮件账户而非公司电子邮件地址；

• Operation of complex and/or international businesses using residential addresses or addresses common to multiple closely-held corporate entities;

使用居住地址或多个密切控股的公司实体共有的地址经营复杂和/或国际业务；

• Changes to standard letters of engagement that obscure the ultimate customer;

对标准业务约定书进行更改，使最终客户模糊不清

• Transactions involving a change in shipments or payments that were previously scheduled for Russia or Belarus;

涉及改变以前预定在俄罗斯或白俄罗斯的货运或付款的交易；

• Transactions involving entities with little or no web presence; or

涉及很少或没有在线商业存在的实体的交易；或

• Routing purchases through certain transshipment points commonly used to illegally redirect restricted items to Russia or Belarus. Notably, DOJ considers countries including China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and jurisdictions close to Russia, including Armenia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan as possible transshipment points.

通过某些常用于将受限物品非法转到俄罗斯或白俄罗斯的转运点进行采购。值得一提的是，美国司法部认为该等的转运地点包括中国（包括香港和澳门）以及接壤俄罗斯的法域，包括亚美尼亚、土耳其和乌兹别克斯坦。

In addition, DOJ warns complacency and stresses that “even a well-designed compliance program may be unsuccessful in practice if implementation is lax, under-resourced, or otherwise ineffective” under the revised Corporate Enforcement Policy.

此外，根据修订后的公司执法政策，美国司法部警告（已有合规体系的企业）自满并强调：“如果执行不严、资源不足或其他方面无效，即使设计良好的合规体系在实践中也可能失败”。

• Outlook / Any To-Dos展望 / 如何跟进？

Going forward, regulators by U.S. and allied countries and partners will deepen multilateral sanction and anti-corruption enforcement focusing more on what a corporation does to assess and address relevant risks and designing tailored controls to manage these risks.  Corporations must ensure their compliance programs, by both words and actions, answer robustly on key questions below (see Exhibit 1 attached hereto)[6]:

下一步：美国和及其盟国伙伴的监管机构将深化多边反腐败与制裁执法合作，并愈来愈有的放矢——企业如何评估和应对相关风险，如何设计并落地相应的风控措施来管理风险。企业必须确保其合规体系，从纸面到行动，均能有力地回答如下关键问题，详见附件一：

“In today’s world, sanctions are the new FCPA.”  These DOJ policies on anti-corruption and sanction evasion have integrated by reference of pre-existing policy administered by OFAC[7], and arrive at the point when the U.S. has identified China as “top threat to U.S. technological competitiveness.”[8] U.S. has imposed de factor embargo on chips above certain technology nodes[9], while blacklisting Chinese entities allegedly evading U.S. sanction regime.

“制裁监管如今是新的反海外贿赂法（FCPA）”。美国司法部关于反腐败和逃避制裁的新政整合了包括由美国财政部外国资产管制办公室的既有政策；其推出与美国将中国确定为“对美国技术竞争力的最大威胁 ”一前一后，相互映照。 美国已经对某些技术节点以上的芯片实施了针对中国事实上的禁运，同时将涉嫌规避美国制裁制度的中国实体列入黑名单。

Chinese regulators so far (as of March 15, 2023) responded in a restrained and engaging manner, by sanctioning mainly certain individuals rather than corporations (except for two major U.S. military brands), along with singling Korea out from encouraging Chinese overseas sightseeing.[10]

迄今为止（2023年3月15日），中国监管机构一直以一种克制、劝阻的方式作出回应，主要制裁某些个人而不是公司（除了两个主要的美国军工品牌），同时将韩国从鼓励中国游客海外观光的名单暂时移除。

Nevertheless, ramification of holistic sanction and anti-corruption enforcement by U.S. and allied countries could unearth trade diversion under-addressed with risky regulatory exposure and uncertainty for international businesses.  European Central Bank recently alerts that “(unspecified) disruptions to economic activity in China could trigger renewed supply chain bottlenecks, with global repercussions.”[11] 

然而，随着美国及其盟国“举国体制”制裁和反腐败执法的深入，过去处于战略模糊的贸易转移重新置于监管视野之下，国际企业面临着风险日益严峻的监管不确定性。 欧洲中央银行最近警示：“（未指明）在中国经济活动若发生中断的可能性将引发新的供应链瓶颈，并产生全球影响”。 

To avoid becoming or associated with “isolated international actors,” companies should ensure that executives and employees are:

• Personally invested in promoting compliance,
• Coming forward and voluntarily disclose discovered misconducts to save it from penalties, and
• Resourcing properly and avoiding risky sanctions evasion and export control violations.

为避免遭遇所谓“国际孤立”，企业须确保从高管到全体员工：

• 将倡导落实合规作为对自己事业的投资并亲力亲为
• 择善从之，自愿披露发现的不当行为，使公司和个人免受处罚
• 合理投入资源，避免触及高风险的制裁规避行为和违反出口管制。

• Data access and preservation: Do compliance and control personnel have sufficient direct or indirect access to relevant sources of data to allow for timely and effective monitoring and/or testing of policies, controls, and transactions?

Exhibit 1: Key Aspects of an Effective Compliance Program under the revised Corporate Enforcement Policy

附录一：美国司法部新修订公司合规政策视野下，合规体系有效性的关键要素

数据访问权限与留存数据：合规和风险管理人员是否有足够的机会直接或间接接触到相关的数据来源，以便及时有效地监测和/或检验合规政策、流程和相关交易？

• Impediment in practice: Do any impediments exist that limit access to relevant sources of data and, if so, what is the company doing to address the impediments?  Key focus is the preservation of and access to corporate data and communications stored on personal devices, “as appropriate and to the greatest extent possible.”

合规落实中的障碍：是否存在任何限制访问相关数据来源的障碍，如果是，企业正在采取举措来排除这些障碍？ 关键在于“在适当和最大程度上 ”保存和访问存储在个人设备上的公司数据和通信。

• Communication channels and policy environment about personal devices and messaging apps: Has Whatsapp or Wechat use impaired in any way the organization’s compliance program or its ability to conduct internal investigations or respond to requests from prosecutors or civil enforcement or regulatory agencies?

手机等个人设备和通讯App使用及其内部政策环境：Whatsapp或Wechat等的使用是否以任何方式损害了所在机构的合规体系，减损内部调查或回应监管机构要求的能力？

• Compliance policy coverage or carve-outs: Does the company have policies or procedures in place to recoup compensation that would not have been achieved but for misconduct attributable directly or indirectly to the executive or employee?

合规政策覆盖范围或排除在合规视野之外的情形：企业是否有相应合规政策或流程，向直接或间接归咎于高管或雇员追回若非不当行为就不会取得的经济收益？

• Executive compensation: Are the terms of bonus and deferred compensation subject to cancellation or recoupment, to the extent available under applicable law, in the event that non-compliant or unethical behavior is exposed before or after the award was issued?

高管薪酬：如果在奖励发放之前或之后不合规或不当行为被曝光，企业奖金和递延报酬安排是否能够被取消或追回（在遵守适用法律规定的范围内）？

• HR practice: What policies and practices does the company have in place to put employees on notice that they will not benefit from any potential fruits of misconduct?

人力资源管理状况：企业有哪些政策和实践让员工注意到他们不会从任何潜在的不当行为的成果中获益？

• Correction/remediation: With respect to the particular misconduct at issue, has the company made good faith efforts to follow its legal & compliance policies and practices in this respect?

纠正/补救措施：对于有争议的特定不当行为，公司是否已作出善意努力，遵循其在这方面的法律与合规政策和实践？

• Compliance culture: How does the company’s hiring and incentive structure reinforce its commitment to ethical culture?

合规文化：公司的招聘和激励体系如何加强其对合规文化的承诺？

• Independence of risk functions (Legal, Compliance, Internal Audit): Is compensation for investigatory personnel structured in a way that ensures the compliance team is empowered to enforce the policies and ethical values of the company?

风险职能（法律、合规、内部审计）的独立性：（内部）调查相关职能岗位的薪酬结构是否能确保合规团队有能力执行公司的政策和道德价值观？

• Management empowerment at investigation & remediation levels: Who determines the compensation, including bonuses, as well as discipline and promotion of compliance personnel or others within the organization that have a role in the disciplinary process generally?

管理层赋能在调查和纠错措施层面的体现：由谁决定包括奖金在内的报酬，由谁决定合规人员或组织内其他在惩戒过程中发挥作用的人员的奖惩和晋升？

• Remediation or window-dressing: Did the company take any actions to recoup or reduce compensation for responsible employees to the extent practicable and available under applicable law?

亡羊补牢还是粉饰太平：企业是否采取了任何行动，追回应当被问责的人员的薪酬（在适用法律规定的可行范围内）？

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[1] Nicholas Mulder, “Sanction Weapon” (Jun. 2022), Finance & Development, IMF Publication, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/authors?author=Nicholas%20Mulder.

[2] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, “The Criminal Division’s Pilot Program Regarding Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks” (Mar. 3, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1571906/download.

[3] Alberto Nardelli, “Russia Is Getting Around Sanctions to Secure Supply of Key Chips for War (Mar. 4, 2023), https://news.yahoo.com/russia-getting-round-sanctions-secure-080001588.html.

[4] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy” (Jan. 17, 2023) (“revised Corporate Enforcement Policy”), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1562851/download; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division, “NSD Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations” (Mar. 1, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/file/1570996/download; “Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco Delivers Remarks at American Bar Association National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 2, 2023)”, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-monaco-delivers-remarks-american-bar-association-national; “Departments of Justice, Commerce and Treasury Issue Joint Compliance Note on Russia-Related Sanctions Evasion and Export Controls (Mar. 3, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-commerce-and-treasury-issue-joint-compliance-note-russia-related (“DOJ-Treasury-Commerce Joint Compliance Note”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs” (Updated March 2023) (Mar. 3, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download.

[5] Yi Wang, Enforcement Policy Stresses Effective Compliance Programs Must Be Follow-through and Prevent Circumvention (Jan. 1, 2023), https://mind-re.org/2023/01/01/surface-or-hide-it-enforcement-policy-stresses-effective-compliance-programs-must-be-follow-throurgh-and-prevent-circumvention/.

[6] See, revised Corporate Enforcement Policy, note 1.

[7] E.g., the revised Corporate Enforcement Policy integrates by reference A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, published in May 2019 by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cente2r0/sanctions/Documents/framework _ofac_cc.pdf.

[8] U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community” (Feb. 6, 2023), https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

[9] U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry Security, “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification” and “Revisions to the Unverified List; Clarifications to Activities and Criteria That May Lead to Additions to the Entity List” (Oct. 13, 2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-13/pdf/2022-21658.pdf.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Press Release respectively on Feb. 17 and Mar. 14, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202302/t20230217_11026614.shtml, and https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202303/t20230314_11040902.shtml.

[11] European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin (Issue 1 2023), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ecbu/eb202301.en.pdf.

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