Monaco Memo (Courtesy Translation) – Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies Following Discussions with Corporate Crime Advisory Group From Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco

Posted by Wang, Yi on January 1, 2023

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The Deputy Attorney General                                                Washington, D.C. 20530

副总检察长（美国司法部副部长）                            华盛顿哥伦比亚特区 20530

September 15, 2022

2022年9月15日

MEMORANDUM FOR

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL DIVISION ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, ANTITRUST DIVISION

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION

DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, TAX DIVISION

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

致如下部门备忘录：

助理总检察长，刑事司

首席副检察长，民事司

助理总检察长，反托拉斯司

助理总检察长，环境和自然资源司

副助理总检察长，税务司

助理总检察长，国家安全司

联邦调查局局长

检察官执行办公室主任

全体美国检察官

FROM: THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL Lisa Monaco

自：副总检察长丽莎∙摩纳哥

SUBJECT: Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies Following Discussions with Corporate Crime Advisory Group

主题：根据公司犯罪问题咨询小组的讨论对公司刑事执法政策的进一步修订

By combating corporate crime, the Department of Justice protects the public, strengthens our markets, discourages unlawful business practices, and upholds the rule of law. Strong corporate criminal enforcement also assures the public that there are not two sets of rules in this country—one for corporations and executives, and another for the rest of America. Corporate criminal enforcement will therefore always be a core priority for the Department.

通过打击公司犯罪，（美国）司法部（本部门）保护了公众，巩固了我们的市场，阻止了非法商业手段，并维护了法治。强有力的针对公司犯罪的刑事执法（公司刑事执法）还向公众保证，在这个国家不存在双重标准——一套针对公司和高管，另一套针对除此以外的其他。正因如此，针对公司刑事执法将始终是本部门的核心优先事项。

In October 2021, the Department announced three steps to strengthen our corporate criminal enforcement policies and practices with respect to individual accountability, the treatment of a corporation’ s prior misconduct, and the use of corporate monitors. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco, “Corporate Crime Advisory Group and Initial Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies,” Oct. 28, 2021 (“October 2021 Memorandum”). Simultaneously, we established the Corporate Crime Advisory Group (“CCAG”)[1] within the Department to evaluate and recommend further guidance and consider revisions and reforms to enhance our approach to corporate crime, provide additional clarity on what constitutes cooperation by a corporation, and strengthen the tools our attorneys have to prosecute responsible individuals and companies.[2] This review considered and incorporated helpful input from a broad cross-section of individuals and entities with relevant expertise and representing diverse perspectives, including public interest groups, consumer advocacy organizations, experts in corporate ethics and compliance, representatives from the academic community, audit committee members, in-house attorneys, and individuals who previously served as corporate monitors, as well as members of the business community and defense bar.

2021年10月，司法部宣布了加强我们在公司刑事执法方针与实践的三个步骤：个人问责、对于公司历史不当行为的评判以及公司监察员的使用。（详见2021年10月28日副总检察长丽莎∙摩纳哥的备忘录，《公司犯罪咨询小组和对公司刑事执法政策的初步修订》（“2021年10月备忘录”）。同时，我们在司法部内成立了公司犯罪咨询小组（”CCAG”），以评估和建议后续指南，并考虑修订和改革，以加强我们处理公司犯罪的手段，进一步明确何谓（司法部所认可的）来自公司的合作，并加强我们检察官起诉并追究个人和公司责任的执法工具。这次审查考虑并采纳了具有相关专业知识和代表不同观点的广泛的个人和实体的有益意见，包括公共利益团体、消费者权益组织、公司道德和合规方面的专家、学术界的代表、审计委员会成员、公司法律顾问和以前担任过公司监察员的专业人士，以及商业界和（白领犯罪）辩护律师。

With the benefit of this input, this memorandum announces additional revisions to the Department’s existing corporate criminal enforcement policies and practices. This memorandum provides guidance on how prosecutors should ensure individual and corporate accountability, including through evaluation of a corporation’s history of misconduct; self-disclosure and cooperation provided by a corporation; the strength of a corporation’ s existing compliance program; and the use of monitors, including their selection and the appropriate scope of a monitor’s work. Finally, this memorandum emphasizes the importance of transparency in corporate criminal enforcement.

受益于这些意见，本备忘录宣布对司法部现有的公司刑事执法政策和实践进行补充修订。本备忘录就检察官应如何确保个人和公司的责任提供了指南，包括通过评估公司的不当行为历史；公司的自我披露与合作；公司现有合规体系的力度；以及使用监察员，包括监察员的选任及其合适的工作范围。最后，本备忘录强调了公司刑事执法透明度的重要性。

In order to promote consistency across the Department, these policy revisions apply Department-wide. Some announcements herein establish the first-ever Department-wide policies on certain areas of corporate crime, such as guidance on evaluating a corporation’s compensation plans; others supplement and clarify existing guidance. The policies set forth in this Memorandum, as well as additional guidance on subjects like cooperation, will be incorporated into the Justice Manual through forthcoming revisions, including new sections on independent corporate monitors.[3]

为了促进整个部门的一致性，这些政策的修订在司法部全部门适用。本备忘录所公布的一些内容就打击某些领域的公司犯罪制定了全部门的政策，例如关于评估公司薪酬计划的指导意见；其他则补充和澄清了现有的指导意见。本备忘录中规定的政策，以及关于合作等主题的进一步指南，将通过即将进行的修订纳入《司法手册》（JM），包括关于独立公司监察员的新章节。

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[1] CCAG members included leaders and experienced prosecutors from all components of the Department that handle corporate criminal matters: the Criminal Division; the Antitrust Division; the Executive Office of United States Attorneys; multiple United States Attorneys’ Offices; the Civil Division; the National Security Division; the Environment and Natural Resources Division; the Tax Division; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

CCAG成员包括来自该部处理公司刑事事务的所有部门的领导人和经验丰富的检察官：刑事司；反垄断司；美国检察官执行办公室；多个美国检察官办公室；民事司；国家安全司；环境和自然资源司；税务司；以及联邦调查局。

[2] While this Memorandum refers to corporations and companies, the terms apply to all types of business organizations, including partnerships, sole proprietorships, government entities, and unincorporated associations. See Justice Manual (“JM”) § 9-28.200.

虽然本备忘录提到了公司和企业，但这些术语适用于所有类型的商业组织，包括合伙企业、独资企业、政府实体和非法人组织。见《司法手册》（”JM”）第9-28.200条。

[3] Department prosecutors will continue to employ the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations as amended by the October 2021 Memorandum and this memorandum- to guide investigations and prosecutions of corporate crime, including with respect to prosecutors’ assessment and evaluation of just and efficient resolutions in corporate criminal cases. See JM §§ 9-28.000 et seq. (“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”).

司法部检察官将继续采用经2021年10月备忘录和本备忘录修订的《联邦起诉商业组织的原则》，以指导对公司犯罪的调查和起诉，包括检察官对公司刑事案件的公正和有效解决的评估和评价。见JM §§ 9-28.000（“联邦起诉商业组织的准则”）。

I. Guidance on Individual Accountability

关于个人责任的指南

The Department’s first priority in corporate criminal matters is to hold accountable the individuals who commit and profit from corporate crime. Such accountability deters future illegal activity, incentivizes changes in individual and corporate behavior, ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and promotes the public’s confidence in our justice system. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates, “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” Sept. 9, 2015. Many existing Department policies promote the identification and investigation of the individuals responsible for corporate crimes. The following policies reinforce this priority.

司法部在公司犯罪问题上的首要任务是追究那些实施公司犯罪并从中获利的个人的责任。这样的问责对于未来的非法活动起到威慑，激励个人和公司行为的改变，确保适当的主体对其行为负责，并促进公众对我们的司法系统的信心。（见2015年9月9日司法部副部长萨利∙奎利安∙耶茨的备忘录《企业不法行为的个人责任》。）许多现有的司法部政策促进了对公司犯罪的个人的识别和调查。以下政策加强了这一优先事项。

1. Timely Disclosures and Prioritization of Individual Investigations

及时披露和确定个人调查的优先次序

To be eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must disclose to the Department all relevant, non-privileged facts about individual misconduct. See October 2021 Memorandum, at 3. The mere disclosure of records, however, is not enough. If disclosures come too long after the misconduct in question, they reduce the likelihood that the government may be able to adequately investigate the matter in time to seek appropriate criminal charges against individuals. The expiration of statutes of limitations, the dissipation of corroborating evidence, and other factors can inhibit individual accountability when the disclosure of facts about individual misconduct is delayed.

为了有资格获得任何合作加分，企业必须向司法部披露关于个人不当行为的所有相关的、非特权（律师当事人保密特权）的事实。见2021年10月备忘录，第3页。 然而，仅仅是对记录有所披露是不够的。如果相关不当行为发生后过久才披露，就会降低政府能够及时充分调查该问题并对个人提出适当刑事指控的可能性。超过诉讼时效、确凿证据的消失以及其他因素都会在针对个人不当行为的事实披露被延迟时，阻挠个人问责的实现。

In particular, it is imperative that Department prosecutors gain access to all relevant, non-privileged facts about individual misconduct swiftly and without delay. Therefore, to receive full cooperation credit, corporations must produce on a timely basis all relevant, non-privileged facts and evidence about individual misconduct such that prosecutors have the opportunity to effectively investigate and seek criminal charges against culpable individuals. Companies that identify significant facts but delay their disclosure will place in jeopardy their eligibility for cooperation credit. Companies seeking cooperation credit ultimately bear the burden of ensuring that documents are produced in a timely manner to prosecutors.

特别强调的是，司法部的检察官应当能够迅速并毫不拖延地获得有关个人不当行为的所有相关、非特权事实。因此，为了获得充分的合作加分，企业必须及时提供有关个人不当行为的所有相关的、非特权的事实和证据，以便检察官有机会有效地调查和寻求对有罪的个人提出刑事指控。查明重要事实但延迟披露的公司将危及其获得合作加分的资格。寻求合作加分的企业最终要承担确保向检察官及时提供文件的责任。

Likewise, production of evidence to the government that is most relevant for assessing individual culpability should be prioritized. Such priority evidence includes information and communications associated with relevant individuals during the period of misconduct. Department prosecutors will frequently identify the priority evidence they are seeking from a cooperating corporation, but in the absence of specific requests from prosecutors, cooperating corporations should understand that information pertaining to individual misconduct will be most significant.

同样，向政府提供与评估个人罪责最相关的证据，也应优先考虑。这种优先证据包括在不当行为发生期间与相关个人有关的信息和通信。司法部的检察官经常会确定他们向合作公司寻求的优先证据，但在检察官没有提出具体要求的情况下，合作企业应该明白，与个人不当行为有关的信息将是最显著的。

Going forward, in connection with every corporate resolution, Department prosecutors must specifically assess whether the corporation provided cooperation in a timely fashion. Prosecutors will consider, for example, whether a company promptly notified prosecutors of particularly relevant information once it was discovered, or if the company instead delayed disclosure in a manner that inhibited the government’ s investigation. Where prosecutors identify undue or intentional delay in the production of information or documents- particularly with respect to documents that impact the government’ s ability to assess individual culpability cooperation credit will be reduced or eliminated.

今后，对于每一起调查的裁决，司法部检察官必须具体评估该企业是否及时提供合作。例如，检察官将考虑，一旦发现特别相关的信息，公司是否及时通知检察官，或者企业是否以妨碍政府调查的方式拖延披露。如果检察官发现在提供信息或文件方面存在不适当或故意的拖延–特别是在影响政府评估个人罪责的文件方面，合作加分将被降低或取消。

Finally, prosecutors must strive to complete investigations into individuals-and seek any warranted individual criminal charges- prior to or simultaneously with the entry of a resolution against the corporation. If prosecutors seek to resolve a corporate case prior to completing an investigation into responsible individuals, the prosecution or corporate resolution authorization memorandum must be accompanied by a memorandum that includes a discussion of all potentially culpable individuals, a description of the current status of the investigation regarding their conduct and the investigative work that remains to be done, and an investigative plan to bring the matter to resolution prior to the end of any statute of limitations period. See JM § 9-28.210. In such cases, prosecutors must obtain the approval of the supervising United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General of both the corporate resolution and the memorandum addressing responsible individuals.

最后，检察官必须努力在对企业作出裁决之前或同时完成对个人的调查，并寻求任何有理由的个人刑事指控。如果检察官在完成对责任人的调查之前寻求解决公司案件，则起诉或公司和解协议授权备忘录必须附有一份如下针对个人问责的备忘录，其中包括对所有可能有罪的个人的讨论，对其行为的调查现状和有待完成的调查工作的描述，以及在任何法定时效期结束之前解决该问题的调查计划。见《司法手册》第9-28.210条。在这种情况下，检察官必须获得主管的美国检察官或助理总检察长对该企业裁决和针对责任人员的备忘录的批准。

• Foreign Prosecutions of Individuals Responsible for Corporate Crime

针对公司犯罪追究个人责任域外当局所提起的公诉

The prosecution by foreign counterparts of individuals responsible for cross-border corporate crime plays an increasingly important role in holding individuals accountable and deterring future criminal conduct. Cooperation with foreign law enforcement partners-both in terms of evidence-sharing and capacity-building- has become a significant part of the Department’s overall efforts to fight corporate crime. At the same time, the Department must continue to pursue forcefully its own individual prosecutions, as U.S. federal prosecution serves as a particularly significant instrument for accountability and deterrence.

司法部外国对等机构对跨境公司犯罪提起公诉追究个人责任在追究个人责任和阻止未来犯罪行为方面发挥着越来越重要的作用。与外国执法伙伴的合作——在证据共享和能力建设方面——已成为美国司法部打击公司犯罪总体努力的一个重要组成部分。同时，司法部必须继续有力地进行自身提起针对个人的公诉，因为美国联邦公诉是问责和威慑的一个特别重要的工具。

At times, Department criminal investigations take place in parallel to criminal investigations by foreign jurisdictions into the same or related conduct. In such situations, the Department may learn that a foreign jurisdiction intends to bring criminal charges against an individual whom the Department is also investigating. The Principles of Federal Prosecution recognize that effective prosecution in another jurisdiction may be grounds to forego federal prosecution. JM § 9-27.220. Going forward, before declining to commence a prosecution in the United States on that basis, prosecutors must make a case-specific determination as to whether there is a significant likelihood that the individual will be subject to effective prosecution in the other jurisdiction. To determine whether an individual is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, prosecutors should consider, inter alia: (1) the strength of the other jurisdiction’s interest in the prosecution; (2) the other jurisdiction’s ability and willingness to prosecute effectively; and (3) the probable sentence and/or other consequences if the individual is convicted in the other jurisdiction. JM § 9-27.240.

有时，司法部的刑事调查与外国司法机构对相同或相关行为的刑事调查并行开展。由此司法部可能得知外国司法机构意图对司法部也在调查的个人提出刑事指控。《联邦起诉准则》认可域外有效司法起诉作为放弃联邦起诉的理由。JM §9-27.220。今后，在以此为由拒绝在美国提起公诉之前，检察官必须针对具体案件确定该人是否有很大可能在其他司法管辖区受到有效起诉。为了确定一个人是否会在另一个司法管辖区受到有效起诉，检察官应特别考虑：（1）其他司法管辖区公诉旨趣的扎实强度；（2）其他司法管辖区有效采取公诉的能力和意愿；以及（3）如果该人在其他司法管辖区被定罪，可能的判决和/或其他后果。JM §9-27.240。

When appropriate, Department prosecutors may wait to initiate a federal prosecution in order to better understand the scope and effectiveness of a prosecution in another jurisdiction. However, prosecutors should not delay commencing federal prosecution to the extent that delay could prevent the government from pursuing certain charges (e.g. , on statute of limitations grounds), reduce the chance of arresting the individual, or otherwise undermine the strength of the federal case.

在适当的时候，司法部的检察官可以等待启动联邦起诉，以便更好地了解另一个司法管辖区的起诉范围和有效性。但是，检察官不应推迟开始联邦起诉，若推迟可能会阻止政府提出某些指控（例如以时效为由）、减少逮捕个人的机会，或以其他方式破坏联邦执法案件的力度。

Similarly, prosecutors should not be deterred from pursuing appropriate charges just because an individual liable for corporate crime is located outside the United States.

同样，检察官不应仅仅因为对公司犯罪负有责任的个人位于美国境外而不进行适当的指控。

II. Guidance on Corporate Accountability

     针对公司责任的指南

A. Evaluating a Corporation’s History of Misconduct

     评估一家企业不当行为的历史

As discussed in the October 2021 Memorandum, in determining how best to resolve an investigation of corporate criminal activity, prosecutors should, among other factors, consider the corporation’s record of past misconduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory resolutions, both domestically and internationally.[1] Consideration of a company’s historical misconduct harmonizes the way the Department treats corporate and individual criminal histories, and ensures that prosecutors give due weight to an important factor in evaluating the proper form of resolution.

正如2021年10月的备忘录中所讨论的，在确定如何最好地解决对公司犯罪活动的调查时，除其他因素外，检察官应考虑该企业既往不当行为记录，包括以前在国内和国际上的刑事、民事和监管裁决。 对该企业过往的不当行为的评估协调了司法部处理公司和个人犯罪历史的方式，并确保检察官在评估适当的解决形式时对一个重要因素给予应有的重视。

Not all instances of prior misconduct, however, are equally relevant or probative. To that end, prosecutors should consider the form of prior resolution and the associated sanctions or penalties, as well as the elapsed time between the instant misconduct, the prior resolution, and the conduct underlying the prior resolution. In general, prosecutors weighing these factors should assign the greatest significance to recent U.S. criminal resolutions, and to prior misconduct involving the same personnel or management. Dated conduct addressed by prior criminal resolutions entered into more than ten years before the conduct currently under investigation, and civil or regulatory resolutions that were finalized more than five years before the conduct currently under investigation, should generally be accorded less weight as such conduct may be generally less reflective of the corporation’s current compliance culture, program, and risk tolerance.[2] However, depending on the facts of the particular case, even if it falls outside these time periods, repeated misconduct may be indicative of a corporation that operates without an appropriate compliance culture or institutional safeguards.

然而，并非所有先前的不当行为都具有同等的相关性或证明力。为此，检察官应考虑如下：先前裁决的形式及其相关制裁或处罚、当前涉诉的不当行为、先前裁决以及先前裁决所涉的既往行为之间的时间间隔。一般来说，检察官在权衡这些因素时，应该对近期的美国刑事裁决以及涉及相同人员或管理层的既往不当行为给予最大的重视。在目前正在调查的行为之前十年以上达成的先前刑事裁决所涉及的既往行为，以及在目前正在调查的行为之前五年以上最终确定的民事或监管裁决，一般应给予较低的权重，因为这些行为通常可能不太反映企业目前的合规文化、流程和风险容忍度。 然而，取决于具体案件的事实，即使既往不当行为不在该等时间段内，反复出现的不当行为也可能表明一家企业的运营缺乏合适的合规文化或制度保障。

In addition to its form, Department prosecutors should consider the facts and circumstances underlying a corporation’s prior resolution, including any factual admissions by the corporation. Prosecutors should consider the seriousness and pervasiveness of the misconduct underlying each prior resolution and whether that conduct was similar in nature to the instant misconduct under investigation, even if it was prosecuted under different statutes. Prosecutors should also consider whether at the time of the misconduct under review, the corporation was serving a term of probation or was subject to supervision, monitorship, or other obligation imposed by the prior resolution.

除了其形式外，司法部检察官应考虑企业此前裁决所依据的事实和情况，包括企业任何事实层面的承认。检察官应考虑每个先前裁决所依据的不当行为的严重性和普遍性，以及该行为在性质上是否与当前调查的不当行为相似，即使它是根据不同的法律被起诉。检察官还应考虑在审查的不当行为发生时，该企业是否受暂缓处罚约束或受到监督、监察或先前裁决所规定的其他义务。

Corporations operate in varying regulatory and other environments, and prosecutors should be mindful when comparing corporate track records to ensure that any comparison is apt. For example, if a corporation operates in a highly regulated industry, a corporation’s history of regulatory compliance or shortcomings should likely be compared to that of similarly situated companies in the industry. Prior resolutions that involved entities that do not have common management or share compliance resources with the entity under investigation, or that involved conduct that is not chargeable as a criminal violation under U.S. federal law, should also generally receive less weight. Prior misconduct committed by an acquired entity should receive less weight if the acquired entity has been integrated into an effective, well-designed compliance program at the acquiring corporation and if the acquiring corporation addressed the root cause of the prior misconduct before the conduct currently under investigation occurred, and full and timely remediation occurred within the acquired entity before the conduct currently under investigation.

不同企业在各种监管及其它环境中运营，检察官在比较企业的既往状况时应注意确保任何比较应当恰当的。例如，如果一家企业在高度监管的行业运营，那么该企业监管合规的历史状况或合规缺陷很可能应与该行业中情况类似的公司进行比较。如果之前的裁决涉及的实体与目前被调查的实体没有共同的管理层或共享合规资源，或者涉及的行为根据美国联邦法律不能被指控为刑事犯罪，一般而言，则该等之前的裁决应该得到较少的重视。如果被收购实体以前的不当行为已被纳入收购方有效的、精心设计的合规体系，并且收购方在目前正在调查的行为发生之前已针对既往不当行为的根本原因予以解决，并且在目前正在调查的行为发生之前在被收购实体内部实施了充分和及时的补救，那么被收购实体以前的不当行为应该得到较少的重视。

Department prosecutors should also evaluate whether the conduct at issue in the prior and current matters reflects broader weaknesses in a corporation’ s compliance culture or practices. One consideration is whether the conduct occurred under the same management team and executive leadership. Overlap in involved personnel- at any level-could indicate a lack of commitment to compliance or insufficient oversight of compliance risk at the management or board level. Beyond personnel, prosecutors should consider whether the present and prior instances of misconduct share the same root causes. Prosecutors should also consider what remediation was taken to address the root causes of prior misconduct, including employee discipline, compensation clawbacks, restitution, management restructuring, and compliance program upgrades.

司法部的检察官还应该评估在以前和现在的事件中出现的行为是否反映了该企业合规文化或实操中更广泛的缺陷。一个考虑因素是这些行为是否发生在同一个管理团队和行政领导层。任何级别的相关人员的重叠都可能表明管理层或董事会缺乏对合规的承诺或对合规风险的监督不足。除了对人员的考察，检察官应考虑目前和以前的不当行为是否有相同的根源问题。检察官还应该考虑采取了哪些补救措施来解决以前的不当行为的根源，包括员工纪律、补偿金追回、赔偿、管理结构调整和合规体系升级措施。

Multiple non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements are generally disfavored, especially where the matters at issue involve similar types of misconduct; the same personnel, officers, or executives; or the same entities. Before making a corporate resolution offer that would result in multiple non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements for a corporation (including its affiliated entities), Department prosecutors must secure the written approval of the responsible U.S. Attorney or Assistant Attorney General and provide notice to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) in the manner set forth in JM § 1-14.000. Notice provided to ODAG pursuant to JM § 1-14.000 must be made at least 10 business days prior to the issuance of an offer to the corporation, except in extraordinary circumstances.

一般而言，不赞成签订多个不起诉或延期起诉协议，特别是在系争事项涉及类似的不当行为、相同的人员、经理或高管或者相同实体。在提出会导致一家企业（包括其关联实体）签订多项不起诉或延期起诉协议的公司解决方案之前，司法部检察官必须获得主持该案的美国检察官或助理总检察长的书面批准，并按照《司法手册》第1-14.000条规定的方式向副总检察长办公室（ODAG）上报。根据《司法手册》第1-14.000条向ODAG上报必须在向该企业发出要约之前至少10个工作日内完成，特殊情况除外。

While multiple deferred or non-prosecution agreements are generally disfavored, nothing in this memorandum should disincentivize corporations that have been the subject of prior resolutions from voluntarily disclosing misconduct to the Department. Department prosecutors must weigh and appropriately credit voluntary and timely self-disclosures of current or prior conduct. Indeed, timely voluntary disclosures do not simply reveal misconduct at a corporation; they can also reflect that a corporation is appropriately working to detect misconduct and takes seriously its responsibility to instill and act upon a culture of compliance. As set forth in the next section of this Memorandum, when determining the appropriate form and substance of a corporate criminal resolution for any corporation, including one with a prior resolution, prosecutors should consider whether the criminal conduct at issue came to light as a result of the corporation’ s timely, voluntary self-disclosure and credit such disclosure appropriately.

虽然通常不赞成签订多个延期或不起诉协议，但本备忘录中的任何内容都不应妨碍那些曾被先前裁决约束的企业自愿向司法部披露不当行为。司法部的检察官必须权衡并适当地相信自愿和及时地自我披露当前或以前的行为。的确，及时的自愿披露并不只是揭示了公司的不当行为；它们还可以反映出公司正在适当地努力发现不当行为，并认真对待其培育合规文化的责任和行动。正如本备忘录的下一节所述，在确定任何企业（包括有先前和解协议的企业）的公司刑事裁决的适当形式和内容时，检察官应考虑系争犯罪行为是否因企业及时、自愿的自我披露而暴露出来，并适当就该等披露加分。

B. Voluntary Self-Disclosure by Corporations

    企业自愿的自我披露

In many circumstances, a corporation becomes aware of misconduct by employees or agents before that misconduct is publicly reported or otherwise known to the Department. In those cases, corporations may come to the Department and disclose this misconduct, enabling the government to investigate and hold wrongdoers accountable more quickly than would otherwise be the case. Department policies and procedures must ensure that a corporation benefits from its decision to come forward to the Department and voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, through resolution under more favorable terms than if the government had learned of the misconduct through other means. And Department policies and procedures should be sufficiently transparent such that the benefits of voluntary self-disclosure are clear and predictable.

在许多情况下，在员工或代理人的不当行为被公开报道或以其他方式为司法部所知之前，企业就已知悉该不当行为。在这些案件中，企业可以向司法部披露这种不当行为，使监管部门能够较之通常情况更快地调查和追究不法分子的责任。司法部的政策和流程必须确保企业从其向司法部主动提出并自愿自我披露不当行为的决定中受益，获得较之由监管部门通过其他途径了解到不当行为而言，更有利的条件进行解决。司法部的政策和流程应足够透明，以便自愿自我披露的优势是明确并且可预测的。

Many Department components that prosecute corporate criminal misconduct have already adopted policies regarding the treatment of corporations who voluntarily disclose their misconduct. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) Corporate Enforcement Policy (Criminal Division); Leniency Policy and Procedures (Antitrust Division); Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations (National Security Division); and Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions (Environment & Natural Resources Division). Of course, voluntary self-disclosure only occurs when companies disclose misconduct promptly and voluntarily (i.e., where they have no preexisting obligation to disclose, such as pursuant to regulation, contract, or prior Department resolution) and when they do so prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation.[3]

许多负责起诉公司刑事不当行为的部门已经采取了有关处理自愿披露其不当行为的公司的政策。例如，见《反海外腐败法》（”FCPA”）企业执法政策（刑事司）；宽恕政策和程序（反垄断司）；商业组织出口管制和制裁执法政策（国家安全司）；以及刑事起诉决定中的因素（环境和自然资源司）。当然，只有当企业迅速和自愿地披露不当行为时（即，他们没有预先存在的披露义务，如根据法规、合同或先前的部门裁决），以及在即将面临披露或政府调查的威胁之前披露时，才能构成自愿自我披露。

Through this memorandum, I am directing each Department of Justice component that prosecutes corporate crime to review its policies on corporate voluntary self-disclosure, and if the component lacks a formal, written policy to incentivize such self-disclosure, it must draft and publicly share such a policy. Any such policy should set forth the component’s expectations of what constitutes a voluntary self-disclosure, including with regard to the timing of the disclosure, the need for the disclosure to be accompanied by timely preservation, collection, and production of relevant documents and/or information, and a description of the types of information and facts that should be provided as part of the disclosure process.[4]  The policies should also lay out the benefits that corporations can expect to receive if they meet the standards for voluntary self-disclosure under that component’ s policy.

通过这份备忘录，我指示司法部每个起诉公司犯罪的部门审查其关于企业自愿自我披露的政策，如果司法部门缺乏正式的书面政策来激励这种自我披露，它必须起草并公开分享这种政策。任何该等政策都应规定司法部门对符合自愿自我披露的条件的要求，包括披露的时机，披露的同时需要及时保存、收集和提供相关的文件和/或信息，并说明作为披露过程的一部分应该提供的信息和事实的类型。  这些政策还应该规定，如果企业达到了司法部门政策规定的自愿自我披露的标准，就可以预期获得何种受益。

All Department components must adhere to the following core principles regarding voluntary self-disclosure. First, absent the presence of aggravating factors, the Department will not seek a guilty plea where a corporation has voluntarily self-disclosed, fully cooperated, and timely and appropriately remediated the criminal conduct. Each component will, as part of its written guidance on voluntary self-disclosure, provide guidance on what circumstances would constitute such aggravating factors, but examples may include misconduct that poses a grave threat to national security or is deeply pervasive throughout the company. Second, the Department will not require the imposition of an independent compliance monitor for a cooperating corporation that voluntarily self-discloses the relevant conduct if, at the time of resolution, it also demonstrates that it has implemented and tested an effective compliance program. Such decisions about the imposition of a monitor will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis and at the sole discretion of the Department.

司法部的所有部门都必须遵守以下关于自愿自我披露的核心原则。首先，在不存在加重处罚情节的情况下，如果企业自愿自我披露，充分合作，并针对犯罪行为及时和适当地补救，司法部将不寻求认罪。作为其关于自愿自我披露的书面指导的一部分，每个部门将提供指导，说明什么情况构成这种加重情节，但例子可包括对国家安全构成严重威胁的不当行为或在整个企业普遍存在的行为。第二，对于自愿自我披露相关行为的合作企业，如果在解决时它还能证明它已经实施并测试了有效的合规体系，司法部将不要求对其施加独立的合规监察员。这种关于实施监察员的决定将继续在个案的基础上，由司法部全权决定。

C. Evaluation of Cooperation by Corporations

     对企业合作的评估

Cooperation can be a mitigating factor, by which a corporation- just like any other subject of a criminal investigation–can gain credit in a case that is appropriate for indictment and prosecution. JM § 9-28. 700. Eligibility for cooperation credit is not predicated upon the waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection. JM § 9-28. 720.[5]

合作可以是一个减刑因素，企业——如同刑事调查的任何其他对象——可以在适合起诉的案件中获得合作加分。《司法手册》§9-28.700。 获得合作加分的资格不以放弃律师-客户特权或工作成果保护为前提。《司法手册》§9-28.720.

Credit for cooperation takes many forms and is calculated differently based on the degree to which a corporation cooperates with the government’s investigation and the commitment that the corporation demonstrates in doing so. The level of a corporation’s cooperation can affect the form of the resolution, the applicable fine range, and the undertakings involved in the resolution.

合作加分有多种形式，并根据企业与政府调查的合作程度以及企业在此过程中表现出的承诺进行不同的计算。企业的合作程度会影响裁决的形式、适用的罚款范围以及裁决中涉及的承诺。

Many existing Department policies discuss the Department’s expectations for full and effective cooperation. See, e.g., JM § 9-28.720 (Cooperation: Disclosing the Relevant Facts); JM § 9-47.120, ¶ 1.3(b) (Full Cooperation in FCPA Matters). The Department will update the Justice Manual to ensure greater consistency across components as to the steps that a corporation will need to take to receive maximum credit for full cooperation.

许多现有的部门政策讨论了司法部对充分有效合作的期望。例如，见JM第9-28.720条（合作：披露相关事实）；JM第9-47.120条，第1.3(b)条（FCP A事务中的全面合作）。司法部将更新《司法手册》，以确保各部门在企业为获得最大程度的全面合作而需要采取的步骤方面更加一致。

Companies seeking credit for cooperation must timely preserve, collect, and disclose relevant documents located both within the United States and overseas. In some cases, data privacy laws, blocking statutes, or other restrictions imposed by foreign law may complicate the method of production of documents located overseas. In such cases, the cooperating corporation bears the burden of establishing the existence of any restriction on production and of identifying reasonable alternatives to provide the requested facts and evidence, and is expected to work diligently to identify all available legal bases to preserve, collect, and produce such documents, data, and other evidence expeditiously.[6]

寻求合作加分的企业必须及时保存、收集和披露位于美国境内和海外的相关文件。在某些情况下，数据隐私法、（针对域外执法管辖权）阻断法律法规或外国法律规定的其他限制可能会使提供位于海外的文件复杂化。在这种情况下，合作企业有责任确定是否存在对文件提供的限制，以及确定合理的替代方法来提供所要求的事实和证据，并被期望能够勤勉合作以确定所有可用的法律依据，以迅速保存、收集和制作这些文件、数据和其他证据。

Department prosecutors should provide credit to corporations that find ways to navigate such issues of foreign law and produce such records. Conversely, where a corporation actively seeks to capitalize on data privacy laws and similar statutes to shield misconduct inappropriately from detection and investigation by U.S. law enforcement, an adverse inference as to the corporation’s cooperation may be applicable if such a corporation subsequently fails to produce foreign evidence.

司法部的检察官应该对那些想方设法解决此类外国法律问题并提供此类记录的企业给予肯定。相反，如果一家公司积极寻求利用数据隐私法律和类似法规来保护不当行为不被美国执法部门发现和调查，那么如果该企业随后未能提供外国证据，则可能适用对该企业合作的不利推断。

D. Evaluation of a Corporation’s Compliance Program

     对公司合规体系的评估

Although an effective compliance program and ethical corporate culture do not constitute a defense to prosecution of corporate misconduct, they can have a direct and significant impact on the terms of a corporation’s potential resolution with the Department. Prosecutors should evaluate a corporation’s compliance program as a factor in determining the appropriate terms for a corporate resolution, including whether an independent compliance monitor is warranted.[7] Prosecutors should assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at two points in time: (1) the time of the offense; and (2) the time of a charging decision. The same criteria should be used in each instance.

尽管有效的合规体系和道德的企业文化并不构成对起诉企业不当行为的辩护，但它们可以对企业与司法部可能达成的和解的具体条件产生直接和重大的影响。检察官应评估企业的合规体系，将其作为确定相应裁决的适当条款的一个因素，包括是否需要独立的合规监察员。 检察官应在两个时间点评估公司合规体系的充分性和有效性：（1）违法行为发生时；以及（2）作出指控决定时。在每一种情况下都应使用相同的标准。

Prosecutors should evaluate the corporation’s commitment to fostering a strong culture of compliance at all levels of the corporation- not just within its compliance department. For example, as part of this evaluation, prosecutors should consider how the corporation has incentivized or sanctioned employee, executive, and director behavior, including through compensation plans, as part of its efforts to create a culture of compliance.

检察官应评估企业对在公司各级组织和员工培育强大的合规文化的承诺，而不仅仅是在其合规部门。例如，作为评估的一部分，检察官应考虑公司如何激励或惩戒员工、高管和董事的行为，包括通过薪酬计划，作为其创造合规文化的努力的一部分。

There are many factors that prosecutors should consider when evaluating a corporate compliance program. The Criminal Division has developed resources to assist prosecutors in assessing the effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program. See Criminal Division, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (updated June 2020). Additional guidance has been provided by other Department components as to specialized areas of corporate compliance. See, e.g. , Antitrust Division, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations (July 2019). Prosecutors should consider, among other factors, whether the corporation’s compliance program is well designed, adequately resourced, empowered to function effectively, and working in practice. Prior guidance has identified numerous considerations for this evaluation, including, inter alia, how corporations measure and identify compliance risk; how they monitor payment and vendor systems for suspicious transactions; how they make disciplinary decisions within the human resources process; and how senior leaders have, through their words and actions, encouraged or discouraged compliance.

检察官在评估公司合规体系时应考虑许多因素。刑事司已经拓展了行政资源，以协助检察官评估公司合规体系的有效性。见刑事司《公司合规体系的评估》（2020年6月更新）。司法部其他部门也为企业合规的专门领域提供了额外的指导。例如，见反垄断司《反垄断刑事调查中的企业合规体系评估》（2019年7月）。除其他因素外，检察官应考虑公司的合规体系是否设计合理、资源充足、被授权有效运作，并在实践中发挥作用。先前的指导意见已经确定了这种评估的众多考虑因素，其中包括公司如何衡量和识别合规风险；如何监测付款和供应商系统的可疑交易；如何在人力资源流程中作出纪律处分决定；以及高级领导人如何通过其言行鼓励或阻止合规。

In addition to those factors, this Memorandum identifies additional metrics relevant to prosecutors’ evaluation of a corporation’s compliance program and culture.

除这些因素外，本备忘录还确定了与检察官评估公司合规体系和文化有关的其他指标。

1. Compensation Structures that Promote Compliance

           促进合规的薪酬架构

Corporations can help to deter criminal activity if they reward compliant behavior and penalize individuals who engage in misconduct. Compensation systems that clearly and effectively impose financial penalties for misconduct can incentivize compliant conduct, deter risky behavior, and instill a corporate culture in which employees follow the law and avoid legal “gray areas.” When conducting this evaluation, prosecutors should consider how the corporation has incentivized employee behavior as part of its efforts to create a culture of ethics and compliance within its organization.

如果公司奖励合规行为并惩罚从事不当行为的个人，则有助于阻止犯罪活动。明确和有效地对不当行为进行经济处罚的薪酬制度可以激励合规行为，阻止危险行为，并培育守法并避免“灰色地带”的企业文化。在进行评估时，检察官应考虑该企业如何激励员工的行为，作为其在组织内创造道德和合规文化的努力的一部分。

Corporations can best deter misconduct if they make clear that all individuals who engage in or contribute to criminal misconduct will be held personally accountable. In assessing a compliance program, prosecutors should consider whether the corporation’s compensation agreements, arrangements, and packages (the “compensation systems”) incorporate elements such as compensation clawback provisions-that enable penalties to be levied against current or former employees, executives, or directors whose direct or supervisory actions or omissions contributed to criminal conduct. Since misconduct is often discovered after it has occurred, prosecutors should examine whether compensation systems are crafted in a way that allows for retroactive discipline, including through the use of clawback measures, partial escrowing of compensation, or equivalent arrangements.

企业若能明确主张所有从事犯罪行为或对犯罪行为负有责任的个人都将被追究个人责任，就能最好地阻止不当行为的发生。在评估合规体系时，检察官应考虑公司的薪酬协议、安排和薪酬激励（“薪酬制度”）是否包含薪酬追回条款等要素，以便对其作为/不作为（直接或管理）导致犯罪行为的现任或前任员工、高管或董事进行处罚。由于不当行为往往在发生后才被发现，检察官应审查薪酬制度的制定是否允许追溯惩戒，包括通过使用追回措施、部分托管薪酬或同等安排。

Similarly, corporations can promote an ethical corporate culture by rewarding those executives and employees who promote compliance within the organization. Prosecutors should therefore also consider whether a corporation’ s compensation systems provide affirmative incentives for compliance-promoting behavior. Affirmative incentives include, for example, the use of compliance metrics and benchmarks in compensation calculations and the use of performance reviews that measure and reward compliance-promoting behavior, both as to the employee and any subordinates whom they supervise. When effectively implemented, such provisions incentivize executives and employees to engage in and promote compliant behavior and emphasize the corporation’s commitment to its compliance programs and its culture.

同样，企业可以通过奖励那些在组织内促进遵纪守法的管理人员和员工来促进企业的道德文化。因此，检察官还应考虑企业的薪酬制度是否为促进合规的行为提供肯定的激励。积极的激励措施包括，例如，在薪酬计算中使用合规指标和基准，以及使用衡量和奖励促进合规行为的绩效评估，包括对员工和他们所监督的任何下属。如果得到有效执行，这些规定可以激励高管和员工从事和促进合规行为，并强调公司对其合规体系和文化的承诺。

Prosecutors should look to what has happened in practice at a corporation-not just what is written down. As part of their evaluation of a corporation’s compliance program, prosecutors should review a corporation’s policies and practices regarding compensation and determine whether they are followed in practice. If a corporation has included clawback provisions in its compensation agreements, prosecutors should consider whether, following the corporation’s discovery of misconduct, a corporation has, to the extent possible, taken affirmative steps to execute on such agreements and clawback compensation previously paid to current or former executives whose actions or omissions resulted in, or contributed to, the criminal conduct at issue.

检察官应关注企业的实际发生了什么，而不仅仅是纸面上宣讲的。作为评估公司合规体系的一部分，检察官应审查公司有关报酬的政策和做法，并确定这些政策和做法在实践中是否得到遵守。如果一家公司在其薪酬协议中包含了追回条款，检察官应考虑在公司发现不当行为后，公司是否尽可能地采取积极措施来执行这些协议，并追回之前支付给现任或前任高管的薪酬，若这些高管的行为或不行为导致或促成了相关的犯罪行为。

Finally, prosecutors should consider whether a corporation uses or has used non-disclosure or non-disparagement provisions in compensation agreements, severance agreements, or other financial arrangements so as to inhibit the public disclosure of criminal misconduct by the corporation or its employees.

最后，检察官应考虑企业是否在补偿协议、离职协议或其他财务安排中使用或曾经使用过不披露或不诋毁条款，以阻止公司或其员工公开披露犯罪的不当行为。

The use of financial incentives to align the interests of the C-suite with the interests of the compliance department can greatly amplify a corporation’s overall level of compliance. To that end, I have asked the Criminal Division to develop further guidance by the end of the year on how to reward corporations that develop and apply compensation clawback policies, including how to shift the burden of corporate financial penalties away from shareholders- who in many cases do not have a role in misconduct–onto those more directly responsible.

使用经济激励措施使高管的利益与合规部门的利益保持一致，可以极大地提高公司的整体合规水平。为此，我已要求刑事司在今年年底前就如何奖励那些制定和应用薪酬追回政策的公司制定进一步的指导意见，包括如何将公司财务处罚的负担从股东——在许多情况下他们并没有在不当行为中发挥作用——转移到那些更直接的责任人身上。

2. Use of Personal Devices and Third-Party Applications

           使用个人设备和第三方应用程序

The ubiquity of personal smartphones, tablets, laptops, and other devices poses significant corporate compliance risks, particularly as to the ability of companies to monitor the use of such devices for misconduct and to recover relevant data from them during a subsequent investigation. The rise in use of third-party messaging platforms, including the use of ephemeral and encrypted messaging applications, poses a similar challenge.

个人智能手机、平板电脑、笔记本电脑和其他设备无处不在，这给企业带来了巨大的合规风险，特别是在公司监测这些设备的使用是否用于不当行为以及在随后的调查中恢复相关数据的能力方面。第三方信息平台使用的增加，包括使用短暂的和加密的信息应用，也带来了类似的挑战。

Many companies require all work to be conducted on corporate devices; others permit the use of personal devices but limit their use for business purposes to authorized applications and platforms that preserve data and communications for compliance review. How companies address the use of personal devices and third-party messaging platforms can impact a prosecutor’s evaluation of the effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program, as well as the assessment of a corporation’s cooperation during a criminal investigation.

许多公司要求所有工作都在公司设备上进行；其他公司则允许使用个人设备，但将其用于商业目的限制在授权的应用程序和平台上，以保存数据和通信，供合规审查。企业如何处理个人设备和第三方信息平台的使用，会影响检察官对公司合规体系有效性的评估，以及对企业在刑事调查中的合作的评估。

As part of evaluating a corporation’ s policies and mechanisms for identifying, reporting, investigating, and remediating potential violations of law, prosecutors should consider whether the corporation has implemented effective policies and procedures governing the use of personal devices and third-party messaging platforms to ensure that business-related electronic data and communications are preserved. To assist prosecutors in this evaluation, I have asked the Criminal Division to further study best corporate practices regarding use of personal devices and third-party messaging platforms and incorporate the product of that effort into the next edition of its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, so that the Department can address these issues thoughtfully and consistently.

作为评估企业识别、报告、调查和补救潜在违法行为的政策和机制的一部分，检察官应考虑公司是否实施了有效的政策和程序来管理个人设备和第三方信息平台的使用，以确保与业务有关的电子数据和通信得到保存。为协助检察官进行这一评估，我已要求刑事司进一步研究有关使用个人设备和第三方信息平台的最佳公司做法，并将这一努力的成果纳入下一版的《公司合规体系评估》，以便刑事司能够周到和一致地处理这些问题。

As a general rule, all corporations with robust compliance programs should have effective policies governing the use of personal devices and third-party messaging platforms for corporate communications, should provide clear training to employees about such policies, and should enforce such policies when violations are identified. Prosecutors should also consider whether a corporation seeking cooperation credit in connection with an investigation has instituted policies to ensure that it will be able to collect and provide to the government all non-privileged responsive documents relevant to the investigation, including work-related communications (e.g. , texts, e-messages, or chats), and data contained on phones, tablets, or other devices that are used by its employees for business purposes.

一般而言，所有拥有强大合规体系的公司都应制定有效的政策，管理个人设备和第三方信息平台在公司通信中的使用，应向员工提供有关这些政策的明确培训，并在发现违规行为时执行这些政策。检察官还应考虑，在调查中寻求合作的公司是否制定了政策，以确保其能够收集并向政府提供与调查有关的所有非特权的响应性文件，包括与工作有关的通信（如短信、电子信息或聊天），以及员工用于业务目的的手机、平板电脑或其他设备中的数据。

III. Independent Compliance Monitorships[8]

       独立的合规监察员

As set forth in the October 2021 Memorandum, Department prosecutors will not apply any general presumption against requiring an independent compliance monitor (“monitor”) as part of a corporate criminal resolution, nor will they apply any presumption in favor of imposing one.

正如2021年10月的备忘录所规定的，司法部检察官将不会适用任何反对要求独立合规监察员（“监察员”）作为公司刑事裁决的一部分的一般推定，也不会适用任何赞成施加监察员的推定。

Rather, the need for a monitor and the scope of any monitorship must depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

相反，对监察员的需求和任何监察员的范围必须取决于特定案件的事实和情况。

A. Factors to Consider When Evaluating Whether a Monitor is Appropriate

     评估监察员是否合适时应考虑的因素

Independent compliance monitors can be an effective means of reducing the risk of further corporate misconduct and rectifying compliance lapses identified during a corporate criminal investigation. Prosecutors should analyze and carefully assess the need for a monitor on a case-by-case basis, using the following non-exhaustive list of factors when evaluating the necessity and potential benefits of a monitor:[9]

独立的合规监察员可以成为减少公司进一步不当行为的风险和纠正公司刑事调查期间发现的合规失误的有效手段。检察官应逐案分析并仔细评估对监察员的需求，在评估监察员的必要性和潜在利益时，应使用以下非详尽的因素清单。

1. Whether the corporation voluntarily self-disclosed the underlying misconduct in a manner that satisfies the particular DOJ component’s self-disclosure policy;

1. 该企业是否以符合司法部特定部门的自我披露政策的方式，自愿自我披露相关的不当行为；

2. Whether, at the time of the resolution and after a thorough risk assessment, the corporation has implemented an effective compliance program and sufficient internal controls to detect and prevent similar misconduct in the future;

2. 在做出裁决时并经过全面的风险评估之后，该企业是否已经实施了有效的合规体系和足够的内控，以发现和防止未来类似的不当行为；

3. Whether, at the time of the resolution, the corporation has adequately tested its compliance program and internal controls to demonstrate that they would likely detect and prevent similar misconduct in the future;

3. 在裁决通过时，该企业是否对其合规体系和内控进行了充分的测试，以证明它们很可能会发现和防止未来类似的不当行为；

4. Whether the underlying criminal conduct was long-lasting or pervasive across the business organization or was approved, facilitated, or ignored by senior management, executives, or directors (including by means of a corporate culture that tolerated risky behavior or misconduct, or did not encourage open discussion and reporting of possible risks and concerns);

4. 潜在的犯罪行为是否在整个企业组织中长期存在或普遍存在，或为高级管理层、高管或董事所批准、协助或忽视（包括通过容忍风险行为或不当行为的企业文化，或不鼓励公开讨论和报告可能的风险和问题）；

5. Whether the underlying criminal conduct involved the exploitation of an inadequate compliance program or system of internal controls;

5. 潜在的犯罪行为是否涉及利用不完善的合规体系或内控体系；

6. Whether the underlying criminal conduct involved active participation of compliance personnel or the failure of compliance personnel to appropriately escalate or respond to red flags;

6. 相关犯罪行为是否涉及合规人员的积极参与，或合规人员未能适当将投诉升级（上报）或对警惕情形予以响应；

7. Whether the corporation took adequate investigative or remedial measures to address the underlying criminal conduct, including, where appropriate, the termination of business relationships and practices that contributed to the criminal conduct, and discipline or termination of personnel involved, including with respect to those with supervisory, management, or oversight responsibilities for the misconduct;

7.公司是否采取了适当的调查或补救措施来处理相关犯罪行为，包括酌情终止促成犯罪行为的业务关系和做法，以及惩戒或终止相关人员，包括对不当行为负有监督、管理或监管责任的人员；

8. Whether, at the time of the resolution, the corporation’ s risk profile has substantially changed, such that the risk of recurrence of the misconduct is minimal or nonexistent;

8. 在作出裁决时，该企业的风险状况是否已发生实质性变化，从而使不当行为再次发生的风险降到最低或不存在。

9. Whether the corporation faces any unique risks or compliance challenges, including with respect to the particular region or business sector in which the corporation operates or the nature of the corporation’s customers; and

9. 该企业是否面临任何独特的风险或合规挑战，包括与该企业经营的特定地区或商业部门或该企业客户的性质有关的风险；以及

10. Whether and to what extent the corporation is subject to oversight from industry regulators or a monitor imposed by another domestic or foreign enforcement authority or regulator.

10. 该企业是否以及在多大程度上受到行业监管机构的监督，或受到其他国内或国外执法机构或监管机构的监督。

The factors listed above are intended to be illustrative of those that should be evaluated and are not an exhaustive list of potentially relevant considerations. Department attorneys should determine whether a monitor is required based on the facts and circumstances presented in each case.

上面列出的因素是为了说明应该评估的因素，而不是可能相关考虑因素的详尽清单。司法部的律师应根据每个案件的事实和情况来决定是否需要监察员。

B. Selection of Monitors

     监察员的选任

In selecting a monitor, prosecutors should employ consistent and transparent procedures. Monitor selection should be performed pursuant to a documented selection process that is readily available to the public. See, e.g., Memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski, Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters, Oct. 11 , 2018, Section E (“The Selection Process”); Environment and Natural Resources Division, Environmental Crimes Section, Corporate Monitors: Selection Best Practices (Mar. 2018); Antitrust Division, Selection of Monitors in Criminal Cases (July 2019).[10]  Every component involved in corporate criminal resolutions that does not currently have a public monitor selection process must adopt an already existing Department process, or develop and publish its own selection process before December 31, 2022.[11] All new selection processes must be approved by ODAG and made public before their implementation as part of any corporate criminal resolution. The appropriate United States Attorney or Department Component Head shall also provide a copy of the process to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, who shall maintain a record of such processes.

在选任监察员时，检察官应采用一致和透明的程序。监察员的选任应根据有记录的选任程序进行，并随时向公众提供。例如，见2018年10月11日助理检察长Brian A. Benczkowski的备忘录：《在刑事司事务中选任监察员》，E部分（“选任流程”）；环境和自然资源司环境犯罪科，《公司监察员选任最佳实践》（2018年3月）；反垄断司，《刑事案件中监察员的选任》（2019年7月）。  参与公司刑事裁决的每一个部门，如果目前没有公开的监察员选任程序，就必须采纳即有司法部程序，或者在2022年12月31日前制定并公布自己的监察员选任流程。 所有新的选任流程必须在作为任何公司刑事裁决的一部分实施之前，得到ODAG的批准并予以公布。适当的美国检察官或部门负责人也应向负责刑事司的助理总检察长提供一份流程副本，后者应保持此类流程的记录。

Any selection process must incorporate elements that promote consistency, predictability, and transparency. First, per existing policy, the consideration of monitor candidates shall be done by a standing or ad hoc committee within the office or component where the case originated. To the extent that such committees did not previously do so, every monitorship committee must now include as a member an ethics official or professional responsibility officer from that office or component, who shall ensure that the other members of the committee do not have any conflicts of interest in selection of the monitor. There shall be a written memorandum to file confirming that no conflicts exist in the committee prior to the selection process or as to the monitor prior to the commencement of the monitor’s work. Second, monitor selection processes shall be conducted in keeping with the Department’s commitment to diversity and inclusion. Third, prosecutors shall notify the appropriate United States Attorney or Department Component Head of their decision regarding whether to require an independent compliance monitor. In order to promote greater transparency, any agreement imposing a monitorship should describe the reasoning for requiring a monitor. [12] ODAG must approve the monitor selection for all cases in which a monitor is recommended, unless the monitor is court-appointed.[13]

任何选任流程都必须包含促进一致性、可预测性和透明度的要素。首先，根据现行政策，对监察员候选人的审议应由案件发生地的办公室或部门的常设或特设委员会进行。如果该等委员会以前没有这样做，那么现在每个监察委员会都必须包括一名来自该办公室或部门的道德官员或职业责任官员作为成员，他们应确保委员会的其他成员在选任监察员时没有任何利益冲突。应有一份书面备忘录存档，确认在选任过程之前，委员会中不存在任何冲突，或在监察员开始工作之前，不存在任何冲突。第二，监察员的选任过程应符合司法部对多样性和包容性的承诺。第三，检察官应将其关于是否需要独立合规监察员的决定通知适当的美国检察官或部门负责人。为了提高透明度，任何实行监察员制度的协议都应说明要求设立监察员的理由。  除非监察员是法院指定的，否则ODAG必须就所有建议设立监察员的案件的监察员人选行使批准权。

C. Continued Review of Monitorships

     持续审查监察员措施

In matters where an independent corporate monitor is imposed pursuant to a resolution with the Department, prosecutors should ensure that the monitor’s responsibilities and scope of authority are well-defined and recorded in writing, and that a clear workplan is agreed upon between the monitor and the corporation- all to ensure agreement among the corporation, monitor, and Department as to the proper scope of review.

在根据与司法部达成的裁决施加独立的公司监察员的情况下，检察官应确保监察员的职责和权力范围得到明确界定并以书面形式记录，监察员和公司之间达成明确的工作计划——所有该等工作均旨在确保公司、监察员和司法部之间就适当的审查范围达成一致。

For the term of the monitorship, Department prosecutors must remain apprised of the ongoing work conducted by the monitor.[14]  Continued review of the monitorship requires ongoing communication with both the monitor and the corporation.[15]

在监察员任期内，司法部的检察官必须随时了解监察员正在进行的工作。  对监察员制度的持续审查需要与监察员和公司持续沟通。

Prosecutors should receive regular updates from the monitor about the status of the monitorship and any issues presented. Monitors should promptly alert prosecutors if they are being denied access to information, resources, or corporate employees or agents necessary to execute their charge. Prosecutors should also regularly receive information about the work the monitor is doing to ensure that it remains tailored to the workplan and scope of the monitorship. In reviewing information relating to the monitor’ s work, prosecutors should consider the reasonableness of the monitor’s review, including, where appropriate, issues relating to the cost of the monitor’ s work. In certain cases, prosecutors may determine that the initial term of the monitorship is longer than necessary to address the concerns that created the need for the monitor, or that the scope of the monitorship is broader than necessary to accomplish the goals of the monitorship. For example, a corporation may demonstrate significant and faster-than-anticipated improvements to its compliance program, and this could reduce the need for continued monitoring. Conversely, prosecutors may determine that newly identified concerns require lengthening the term or amending the scope of the monitorship.

检察官应定期收到监察员关于监察员身份和任何问题的最新信息。如果监察员被拒绝接触执行其指责所需的信息、资源或公司员工或代理人，应及时提醒检察官。检察官也应定期收到有关监察员工作的信息，以确保其符合工作计划和监察员的范围。在审查与监察员工作有关的信息时，检察官应考虑监察员审查的合理性，包括酌情考虑与监察员工作成本有关的问题。在某些情况下，检察官可能会确定，监察员的初始任期超过了解决导致需要监察员的问题所需的时间，或者监察员的范围超过了实现监察员目标所需的范围。例如，一家公司可能表现出对其合规体系的重大改进，而且速度比预期的快，这可能会减少继续监督的必要性。反之，检察官可能认为新发现的问题需要延长监测期限或修改监测范围。

IV. Commitment to Transparency in Corporate Criminal Enforcement

      对公司刑事执法透明度的承诺

Transparency regarding the Department’s corporate criminal enforcement priorities and processes-including its expectations as to corporate cooperation and compliance, and the consequences of meeting or failing to meet those expectations-can encourage companies to adopt robust compliance programs, voluntarily disclose misconduct, and cooperate fully with the Department’s investigations. Transparency can also instill public confidence in the Department’s work.

关于司法部的公司刑事执法优先事项和程序的透明度——包括其对企业合作和合规的期望，以及达到或未达到这些期望的后果——可以鼓励企业采取强有力的合规体系，自愿披露不当行为，并在司法部的调查中充分合作。透明度也可以使公众对司法部的工作充满信心。

When the Department elects to enter into an agreement to resolve corporate criminal liability, the agreement should, to the greatest extent possible, include: (1) an agreed-upon statement of facts outlining the criminal conduct that forms the basis for the agreement; and (2) a statement of relevant considerations that explains the Department’s reasons for entering into the agreement. Relevant considerations may, for example, include the corporation’s voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remedial efforts (or lack thereof); the cooperation credit, if any, that the corporation is receiving; the seriousness and pervasiveness of the criminal conduct; the corporation’s history of misconduct; the state of the corporation’s compliance program at the time of the underlying criminal conduct and the time of the resolution; the reasons for imposing an independent compliance monitor or any other compliance undertaking, if applicable; other applicable factors listed in JM § 9-28.300; and any other key considerations related to the Department’s decision regarding the resolution.

当司法部选择签订协议来解决公司的刑事责任时，该协议应尽可能包括：(1)一份商定的事实声明，概述构成协议基础的犯罪行为；(2)相关考量因素的声明，解释司法部签订协议的原因。例如，相关的考虑因素可以包括：公司的自愿自我披露、合作和补救努力（或缺乏这种努力）；公司获得的合作加分（如有）；犯罪行为的严重性和普遍性；公司的不当行为历史；公司在发生相关犯罪行为时和解决时的合规体系状况；施加独立合规监察员或任何其他合规承诺的原因（如适用）；《司法手册》第9-28条中所列的其他适用因素。 300中所列的其他适用因素；以及与司法部关于裁决的决定有关的任何其他关键考虑。

Absent exceptional circumstances, corporate criminal resolution agreements will be published on the Department’s public website.

如果没有特殊情况，公司刑事解决协议将在司法部的公共网站上公布。

***

Robust corporate criminal enforcement remains central to preserving the rule of law ensuring the same accountability for all, regardless of station or privilege. Thank you for the work you do every day to fulfill the Department’s mission.

强有力的公司刑事执法仍然是维护法治的核心，确保对所有人实行同样的问责制，无论其职位或特权如何。感谢你们每天为履行司法部的使命所做的工作。

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[1] The term “resolution” covers both post-trial adjudications and stipulated non-trial resolutions, such as plea agreements, non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, civil consent decrees and stipulated orders, and pre-trial regulatory enforcement actions.

裁决 “一词包括审判后的裁决和规定的非审判决议，如认罪协议、不起诉协议、延期起诉协议、民事同意法令和规定的命令，以及审判前的监管执法行动。

[2] Corporations should be prepared to produce a list and summary of all prior criminal resolutions within the last ten years and all civil or regulatory resolutions within the last five years, as well as any known pending investigations by U.S. (federal and state) and foreign government authorities. Attorneys for the government may tailor (or expand) this request to obtain the information that would be most relevant to the Department’s analysis.

公司应准备提供一份过去十年内所有刑事决议和过去五年内所有民事或监管裁决（和解协议）的清单和摘要，以及任何已知的美国（联邦和州）和外国政府当局的未决调查。政府的律师可以调整（或扩大）这一要求，以获得与司法部分析最相关的信息。

[3] Voluntary self-disclosure of misconduct is distinct from cooperation with the government’s investigation, and prosecutors should thus consider these factors separately. See, e.g., JM § 9-28.900 (addressing voluntary disclosures generally); JM § 9-47.120 (describing credit for voluntary self-disclosure in FCPA matters).

自愿自行披露不当行为与配合政府调查不同，因此检察官应分别考虑这些因素。例如，见JM第9-28.900条（一般涉及自愿披露）；JM第9-47.120条（描述了在FCPA事项中自愿自我披露的合作加分）。

[4] For example, the FCPA Corporate Enforcement policy sets forth the following requirements for a corporation to receive credit for voluntary self-disclosure of wrongdoing: the disclosure must qualify under U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(l) as occurring “prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation”; the corporation must disclose the conduct to the Department “within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense,” with the burden on the corporation to demonstrate timeliness; and the corporation must disclose all relevant facts known to it, “including as to any individuals substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue.” JM § 9-47.120.

例如，《FCPA公司执法政策》规定了公司因自愿自行披露不法行为而获得奖励的下列要求：根据《美国法典》§ 8C2.5(g)(l)，披露必须符合 “在即将面临披露或政府调查的威胁之前”的条件；公司必须在“知悉违法行为后的合理时间内”向该部披露该行为。公司有责任证明其及时性；公司必须披露其知道的所有相关事实，“包括任何实质性参与或负责有关不当行为的个人。” JM §9-47.120。

[5] Instead, the sort of cooperation that is most valuable to resolving allegations of misconduct by a corporation and its officers, directors, employees, or agents is disclosure of the relevant facts concerning such misconduct. In this regard, the analysis parallels that for a non-corporate defendant, where cooperation typically requires disclosure of relevant factual knowledge and not of discussions between an individual and the individual’s attorneys. Id

相反，对解决公司及其高级职员、董事、雇员或代理人的不当行为指控最有价值的合作是披露与这种不当行为有关的事实。在这方面，该分析与非公司被告的分析相似，合作通常要求披露相关的事实，而不是被指控者个人与律师之间的讨论。同上

[6] This requirement now applies to all corporations under investigation that are seeking to cooperate. The requirement already applies to investigations involving potential violations of the FCPA. See JM § 9-47.120.

这一要求现在适用于所有接受调查并寻求合作的公司。该要求已经适用于涉及潜在违反FCPA的调查。见JM第9-47.120条。

[7] At the same time, the mere existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents. See JM 9-28.800.

同时，仅仅存在一个合规体系本身并不足以证明不对公司的高级职员、董事、雇员或代理人的刑事不当行为进行指控。见JM 9-28.800。

[8] In September 2021, the Associate Attorney General issued a memorandum concerning the use of monitorships in civil settlements involving state and local governmental entities. Memorandum from Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta, “Review of the Use of Monitors in Civil Settlement Agreements and Consent Decrees Involving State and Local Government Entities,” Sept. 13, 2021. That memorandum continues to govern the use of monitors in those cases.

2021年9月，副总检察长发布了一份关于在涉及州和地方政府实体的民事和解中使用监监察员的备忘录。副总检察长Vanita Gupta的备忘录，《审查涉及州和地方政府实体的民事和解协议和同意法令中监察员的使用》，2021年9月13日。该备忘录继续规范这些案件中监察员的使用。

[9] For components or U.S. Attorney’ s Offices that do not have extensive corporate resolution experience, consultation with DOJ components that more routinely assess such compliance programs, internal controls, and remedial measures is recommended

对于没有广泛的企业解决经验的部门或美国检察官办公室，建议与更经常地评估此类合规体系、内控和补救措施的司法部部门进行协商。

[10] This requirement does not apply to cases involving court-appointed monitors, where prosecutors must give due regard to the appropriate role and procedures of the court.

这一要求不适用于涉及法院指定的监察员的案件，在这些案件中，检察官必须适当考虑到法院的适当作用和程序。

[11] Unless they adopt and publish their own processes pursuant to the principles set forth herein, U.S. Attorney’s Offices should follow the selection process developed by the Criminal Division, unless partnering with a Department component that has its own preexisting selection process.

除非美国检察官办公室根据本文提出的原则通过并公布自己的流程，否则他们应遵循刑事司制定的选任流程，除非与有自己预先存在的选任流程的部门共同执法。

[12] The appropriate United States Attorney or Department Component Head shall, in tum, provide a copy of the agreement to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at a reasonable time after it has been executed. The Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division shall maintain a record of all such agreements.

适当的美国检察官或部门负责人应在协议签署后的合理时间内向刑事司助理检察长提供一份协议副本。负责刑事司的助理总检察长应保持所有此类协议的记录。

[13] See Morford Memorandum, at p. 3 (requiring, for cases involving the use of monitors in DPAs and NPAs, that “the Office of the Deputy Attorney General must approve the monitor”).

见《莫福德备忘录》，第3页（对于涉及在DP As和NPAs中使用监察员的案件，要求“副总检察长办公室必须批准监察员”）。

[14] In cases of court-appointed monitors, the court may elect to oversee this inquiry.

在法院指定的监察员的情况下，法院可以选择监督这种调查。

[15] Per existing policy, any agreement requiring a monitor should also explain what role the Department could play in resolving disputes that may arise between the monitor and the corporation, given the facts and circumstances of the case. See Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary C. Grindler, “Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecutions and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporation,” May 25, 2010.

根据现有政策，任何需要监察员的协议也应解释，鉴于案件的事实和情况，司法部在解决监察员和公司之间可能出现的争端方面可以发挥什么作用。见代理副总检察长加里-C-格林德勒，”关于在与公司签订的延缓起诉和不起诉协议中使用监察员的补充指导意见”，2010年5月25日。

(Translated by Yi Wang,, January 1, 2023)

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